


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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

1 DECEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 48)

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 22 - 28 NOVEMBER 1971

<u>Moscow (2817 items)</u>	<u>Peking (1344 items)</u>
Supreme Soviet Session (1%) 21%	Indochina (20%) 40%
[Kosygin Speeches (--) 7%]	[Pham Van Dong (11%) 32%]
CPSU Central Committee (--) 13%	in PRC
Plenum	Domestic Issues (18%) 13%
Indochina (5%) 4%	United Nations (28%) 11%
Middle East (3%) 3%	[Disarmament Debate (--) 3%]
China (5%) 3%	[PRC Seat on (--) 3%]
Somali President (3%) 2%	Security Council
Barre in USSR	Guinea Invasion (--) 5%
West German CP (DKP) (0.1%) 2%	Anniversary
Congress	Albanian National Day (--) 3%
	Indian-Pakistani (1%) 3%
	Conflict

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

COMMUNIQUE ON PHAM VAN DONG VISIT TO PRC SEES CLOSER TIES

Both the Chinese and North Vietnamese used the 20-27 November visit to the PRC by Pham Van Dong's party-government delegation as an occasion for effusive testimony to Sino-Vietnamese solidarity while skirting areas of possible discord. The Chinese were at pains to impress upon their guests and the world at large that President Nixon's forthcoming visit and the recent PRC leadership reshuffle will not divert Peking from continuing unstinting support to the Vietnamese. Having received reassurances on this score, the Vietnamese joined with their hosts in a communique registering satisfaction that relations of "intimate and solid friendship and unity" are binding the two sides "ever more closely."

After signing the joint communique on the 25th, the DRV delegation toured Shanghai and Canton accompanied by Chou En-lai before returning to Hanoi on the 27th. As in the communique on Chou's visit to Hanoi last March, the current document says the talks between the two sides were held in "a most cordial and friendly atmosphere, which fully manifested the fraternal friendship and militant unity" between the two peoples. Also like the March communique, the current one lists the situation in Indochina and "questions of common interest" as subjects of the talks. But in adding another subject--"the strengthening of the friendly relations and cooperation" between the two countries--the current communique may reflect concern by the two sides to overcome strains in their relations resulting from Peking's invitation to President Nixon.

The communique cites the "excellent" situation in Indochina resulting from the "victories of strategic significance" won in the past year. That the Chinese may have favored a stronger statement is suggested by the fact that Chou En-lai in a major speech on the 23d described the situation in Indochina as "unprecedentedly fine"--an appraisal that began to appear in Chinese comment following the Lam Son 719 operation. The communique last March--issued during Lam Son 719--was replete with warnings about the "extremely grave war escalation" in Indochina and directly linked China's security with that of the DRV. That communique also said the

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two sides "reached completely identical views" in discussions on how to deal with possible further military actions by the United States. In the only reference to unanimity in the current communique, the two sides "unanimously point out" that the Indochina war "was caused by U.S. aggression and it will end only with the United States' stopping its aggression and all its interference."* Consistent with the emphasis in Hanoi's recent statements, notably Dong's speeches during the visit, the communique focuses on Washington's Vietnamization policy and support for the Thieu regime as the central concern in the present circumstances.

CHINESE SUPPORT In the communique the Chinese reaffirm their "unshirkable internationalist duty" to support the Vietnamese war effort "to the end," repeating the assurance that the Chinese "will not flinch even from the greatest national sacrifices." This formulation dramatizing Peking's commitment, which dates back to 1965, was revived by Chou during his Hanoi visit in March and appeared in the communique on that visit; it was also repeated by Li Hsien-nien when he headed a Chinese aid delegation to Hanoi in September.

Some of the Chinese comment on assistance during the Dong visit was couched in unusual terms that may reflect some of the issues in the recent PRC leadership crisis and disputes over economic priorities. On the 24th, Chou repeated Mao's "instruction"--first voiced by Chou during his March visit to Hanoi--that "if anyone among us should say that we should not help the Vietnamese" that would be "betrayal of the revolution." This formula, with its overtones of discord over the nature and extent of aid to the DRV, had been paraphrased by Li in Hanoi in September and then by Chou in his 23 November Peking rally speech, in effect reassuring the Vietnamese that Sino-U.S. developments will not affect Peking's commitments to its allies. In his speech on the 24th

* In contrast, the joint communique on the recent visits to the DRV by Soviet President Podgorny, the DPRK's Pak Song-chol, and Ieng Sary, "special envoy" of Sihanouk's government, said the talks registered unanimity of views on the subjects discussed. These more comprehensive assessments seem to have been included at the visitors' behest. DRV spokesmen during the visits avoided referring to unanimity of views even as the guests so characterized the talks.

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in which he revived the full instruction, Chou added other remarks suggesting that the Chinese are now in a better position to assist the Vietnamese. Noting that Dong was going to tour southern parts of China, Chou said that "you will see that the mental outlook of our people, through tempering in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, has deeply changed," adding that in the future "it will be possible for our people to perform our internationalist duty better than before and give more support and assistance to the Vietnamese and Indochinese peoples."

Chinese speeches during Dong's tour of Shanghai and Canton were even more explicit in acknowledging that the PRC had fallen short in aiding the Vietnamese. Both Chang Chun-chiao, Politburo member and Shanghai party chief, and Kwangtung party head Liu Hsing-yuan admitted that what their respective areas have done to support the Vietnamese "falls far short of the expectations" of the Vietnamese comrades and that the Chinese "still have many shortcomings" in their work. Both speakers solicited the guests' "criticisms and suggestions" to help the Chinese improve their assistance.

During the provincial tour Dong, for his part, was unusually specific in thanking the Chinese for their assistance. In Shanghai he thanked the people for having provided "complete sets of equipment for many important factories in the North, many transportation facilities, farm machinery, materials and equipment as well as large quantities of consumer goods. You have trained and brought up for us thousands of workers and technicians, and sent to Vietnam many enthusiastic and experienced experts." In Canton Dong similarly noted that "you have provided us with large quantities of equipment, materials, and consumer goods, trained many technical personnel and workers for us, and taken meticulous care of the Vietnamese cadres receiving medical treatment here."

INTERNATIONALISM The two sides registered a meeting of minds on the key issue of proletarian internationalism, which had emerged as a touchstone of divergent Chinese and Vietnamese positions in recent months in the wake of the announcement of President Nixon's visit to Peking. In the joint communique the two sides "note with satisfaction" that their relations "have continuously been consolidated and developed on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." This "intimate and solid

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friendship and unity of 'both comrades and brothers,'" credited to the nurture of Ho Chi Minh and Mao, "are binding ever more closely the parties and peoples of China and Vietnam."

In the course of the visit, Dong's formulations on proletarian internationalism converged with those of the Chinese after an initial reluctance to match the Chinese claims.* By the time of Dong's 23 November Peking rally speech, in which he effusively praised Sino-Vietnamese unity, the DRV leader was prepared to acknowledge that "our relations based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism have developed daily and become all the more unbreakable;" he further added an expression of gratitude for Chinese support "filled with noble proletarian internationalist sentiments."** At the Peking banquet his delegation gave on the 24th, Dong noted that the Chinese speeches during his visit had been "full of proletarian internationalist spirit," and he forcefully reaffirmed that Sino-Vietnamese friendship "is based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and no force on earth can shake it."

At the same time, however, Dong continued the DRV's practice of singling out the USSR as well as the PRC in expressing gratitude for aid. Although he had not mentioned Moscow in his rally speech on the 23d, he did include references to the Soviet Union in his speeches on the 20th and 24th. A 27 October QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the joint communique thanked the USSR as well as the PRC for assistance, pointedly noting that assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries has been valuable in the struggle against U.S. imperialism, "the enemy number one of progressive mankind."

* The divergence between Chinese and Vietnamese positions on this issue in recent months, including that reflected at the beginning of Dong's visit, is discussed in the TRENDS of 24 November, pages 4-5.

** One of the first authoritative indicators of the degree of Hanoi's disquiet over Peking's invitation to President Nixon was Defense Minister Giap's failure for the first time in his annual congratulatory message on the 1 August anniversary of the Chinese PLA to characterize Chinese assistance as being in the spirit of "proletarian internationalism."

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COMMUNIST UNITY Dong's speech on the 24th included, for the first time during the visit, a renewal of the plea contained in Ho's will that "our party will do its best to contribute effectively to the restoration of unity among the fraternal parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." The appeal in Ho's will, issued in September 1969 at a time when Sino-Soviet tensions were at a peak, had been recalled by DRV leaders three times previously in the past two months. Le Duan's invocation of the appeal for communist unity at a 4 October rally welcoming Podgornyy represented the first such high-level DRV pledge to work for the restoration of unity since last June--that is, since before Peking's invitation to President Nixon and Hanoi's July-August polemics charging that the Nixon Doctrine is aimed at splitting the communist countries. Ho's "teachings" on the restoration of solidarity of the socialist camp were mentioned in an article on DRV diplomacy by Foreign Minister Trinh in the October issue of the party journal HOC TAP. In a 14 October interview with the Italian CP organ L'UNITA, as carried by VNA English on the 18th, Dong responded to a question on the DRV's policy of unity within the communist world by pledging to carry out Ho's will. (Strangely, however, the 29 October joint communique on the visit to the DRV of North Korea's Pak Song-chol said nothing about efforts to divide the communist countries or about the need to work for restoration of communist solidarity.)

Apart from Dong's invocation of Ho's will, the subject of Sino-Soviet discord was largely avoided in the mutual effort of the Chinese and Vietnamese to project a sense of harmony. The sole anti-Soviet barb was contained in Chou's speech on the 23d when he voiced Peking's line on the medium and small countries uniting against the superpowers. On the same occasion Dong in effect rebutted Peking's line by linking China and Vietnam with "the entire powerful socialist camp." During the visit Dong did not, however, repeat North Vietnamese statements at the time of Chou's visit last March that the DRV stands at the southeastern outpost of the socialist camp.

U.S. POLICY In another area of likely divergence, policy toward the United States, the two sides sought to reach an accommodation by expressing mutual concern over the application of the Nixon Doctrine in the form of Vietnamization. In a reference to the American role in Asia generally, the joint communique points out that Washington is applying the

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Nixon Doctrine in Indochina by "talking about 'reducing U.S. commitments' in Asia; this in essence is to prolong, intensify, and expand its war of aggression against Indochina." The Chinese took the occasion of the visit to ascribe priority to the Vietnam conflict among current international problems, in effect seeking to reassure the North Vietnamese that Sino-U.S. relations will not take precedence over their cause. This point, which was made by Chou in his welcoming remarks on the 20th, was repeated in a 28 November PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the visit.

Perhaps in a gesture to Hanoi's apprehension over the meaning of the Nixon visit, the Chinese joined the Vietnamese in asserting in the communique that "U.S. imperialism," though "constantly altering its tactics and methods," has "not in the least changed its aggressive ambition." However, while reciting standard views of the two sides on Korea, Japan, and other subjects, the communique does not directly address itself to the Nixon Administration's policies or the role of the Nixon Doctrine outside the Indochina context.

VIETNAM SETTLEMENT In noting that the two sides affirm that the PRG seven-point proposal provides the correct basis for a Vietnam settlement, the joint communique repeats Pham Van Dong's 20 November hardened elaboration of points one and two on U.S. withdrawal and support for President Thieu: Thus, it specifies that U.S. withdrawal and ceasing aggression as outlined in point one must include putting "an end to all activities of U.S. air and naval forces and all other military acts against the people in both the southern and northern parts of Vietnam"; and it explains that the provision under point two for an end to U.S. interference and support for President Thieu means that the United States must "relinquish all its commitments to the fascist Nguyen Van Thieu clique." Editorials in the 27 November DRV party organ NHAN DAN and the army paper QI'AN DOI NHAN DAN reviewing the joint communique quote these passages verbatim. However, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 28th refers more generally to the two "most important points" of the PRG proposal: "U.S. imperialism must speedily, totally and unconditionally withdraw its troops from South Vietnam and stop supporting the Nguyen Van Thieu clique."

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SOVIET COVERAGE TASS and Moscow radio broadcasts carried brief, factual reports of Pham Van Dong's activities in China. The reports predictably singled out his expressions of gratitude for Soviet aid, his toasts to the solidarity of the communist countries, and his recollection of the call in Ho's will for a restoration of communist unity.

A commentary broadcast in Mandarin over Radio Peace and Progress on 27 November cited Dong's thanks to the Soviet Union for assistance and said that these remarks reflect "a close, genuine internationalist relationship" between the Vietnamese people and the peoples of the USSR and other socialist countries. The commentary went on to cite examples of Soviet aid, including shipments of weapons, military equipment, and ammunition, the assistance of Soviet military specialists in setting up a DRV antiaircraft system, and economic aid. It concluded with the assertion that these facts contradict "Chinese propaganda machinery's fabrications" that the Soviet Union "has betrayed the interests of the friends in Indochina."

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COMMUNISTS DENOUNCE NEW SOUTH VIETNAMESE MOVE INTO CAMBODIA

The 22 November launching of a new ARVN operation into Cambodia prompted official protests from the PRG's spokesman in Paris on the 23d, from a spokesman of Sihanouk's foreign ministry on the 25th, and by a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 30th. Peking endorsed the Sihanouk government's protest in a 28 November PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which denounced "U.S. imperialism" for "this new crime of aggression" and expressed confidence that the operation would "certainly end in ignominious defeat."

All three Indochinese statements claimed that the United States is behind the new military move. The PRG and DRV spokesmen, charging that the operation is commanded by U.S. officers and supported by U.S. aircraft, maintained that the new "aggression" demonstrates the "deceitful character" of President Nixon's "allegation" about the cessation of the U.S. combat role and refraining from direct interference in Cambodia.

The ARVN incursion was also condemned in articles published in the DRV party organ NHAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 27 November. The papers also stressed U.S. responsibility for the operation, with NHAN DAN asserting that the ARVN troops "were sent into Cambodia on U.S. orders, with direct support of the U.S. Air Force, and with the participation of U.S. troops." To document the latter charge, NHAN DAN cited a Western news report that an American captain had been seen with South Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. In addition to denouncing the Cambodian operation, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN scored "fierce U.S. air strikes," the "scheme" to send ARVN troops into southern Laos, and "recent repeated" air strikes against the DRV. The army paper routinely claimed that these actions demonstrate that "Nixon is very stubborn and still persists in scheming to prolong and expand the war of aggression" in Indochina.

APPEAL TO CITIZENS OF PHNOM PENH

Shortly after the launching of the ARVN operation an unusual broadcast on the 23d over Sihanouk's clandestine radio sought to play upon Cambodian concern about fighting near the capital and hostility toward the Saigon forces. It charged that the Lon Nol government had "decided that before they are completely defeated and before they take flight abroad they will allow the U.S. imperialists and Saigon running dogs to destroy Phnom Penh." The broadcast alleged that "according to the U.S. imperialist

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radio, on 19 November 1971 the U.S. imperialists sent planes to bomb the outskirts of Phnom Penh and dispatched Thieu-Ky troops to destroy Phnom Penh and quell the people." It called upon the Cambodian people to "prevent the Thieu-Ky gang from entering Phnom Penh, the U.S. pirates from annihilating Phnom Penh," and the "wounded" Lon Nol regime from "escaping." The broadcast also urged the people to take up arms against the government and to "evacuate" to the "liberated zone" to avoid U.S. bombing and strafing.

LAOS: SOUPHANOUVONG LETTER REVERTS TO CALL FOR BOMBING HALT

Prince Souphanouvong resumes the nearly two-year-old correspondence with Prince Souvanna Phouma on the issue of a settlement in Laos with a hard-line letter dated 20 November and delivered on the 23d by the NLHS permanent representative in Vientiane, Soth Pethrasi. This reopens the correspondence which had been interrupted last August when Tiao Souk Vongsak, Souphanouvong's "special envoy," left Vientiane for Sam Neua after delivering a letter denouncing Souvanna Phouma for refusing to accept the 22 June NLHS proposal for a simultaneous bombing halt and cease-fire throughout the whole territory of Laos.*

The current message reverts to the NLHS stand prior to the 22 June proposal in demanding that the United States "stop its war of aggression in Laos," and that "first of all it must stop immediately and unconditionally the bombardment of the whole territory of Laos so that contacts may be created for the Lao people to sit down together and settle their own affairs without foreign interference." In apportioning the blame, the message, like previous letters, places "full responsibility" for the consequences of new military adventures on the Nixon Administration and warns Souvanna Phouma that he will also have to bear his "share" of the responsibility. While Souphanouvong's sharpest attack is against President Nixon, he also assails Souvanna Phouma. He claims that the situation in Laos is worsening due to the "sinister schemes of the Nixon Administration" and calls the President "the most barbarous murderer of our times." But Souphanouvong also accuses Souvanna Phouma of having discussed

* For a discussion of the Souvanna Pl. ... a-Souphanouvong exchange of letters following the 22 June NLHS proposal see the TRENDS of 14 July 1971, pages 8-9 and 11 August 1971, pages 7-8.

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intensification of the U.S. bombing and an increase of Thai troops in Laos with the President during his Washington visit in September. And he warns the Prince that "unless you resume without delay the line which conforms to the aspirations of the nation and which you adopted in the 1961-62 period, the Lao people will not tolerate these misdeeds of yours."

Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow media have all reported the Souphanouvong message as usual, but thus far there has been no comment. There has as yet been no communist acknowledgment of Souvanna Phouma's 27 November reply to Souphanouvong which complains that the latter once again was silent about North Vietnamese aggression in Laos, and which repeats suggestions that Tiao Souk Vongsak be given authority to negotiate and that the Plain of Jars be neutralized.

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CHINA

JOINT EDITORIAL CONDEMNS "SWINDLERS," CALLS FOR PARTY UNITY

A joint RED FLAG-PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial, released on 30 November, calls for strengthening party leadership to overcome "the great harm to the unity and unification of the party" caused by Liu Shao-chi and "other swindlers." The use of a joint editorial, the most authoritative form of media comment, raises the propaganda campaign against Lin Piao to a higher stage and underscores the need to step up efforts to strengthen party authority over all aspects of society. All other joint editorials issued since August 1969 have been pegged to specific anniversaries; with none released for National Day this year, the last such joint editorial came on Army Day, 1 August.

Utilizing a lengthy quotation from a speech by Mao in 1964, the current editorial recalls the past "conspiracies and intrigues" that "emerged on the Central Committee." Mao is quoted as saying (in 1964) that "even now . . . persons plotting is an objective fact." The editorial then pointedly observes on its own that throughout the party's history "bourgeois careerists, conspirators and persons having illicit relations with foreign countries" have only brought "disgrace and destruction upon themselves in the end."

While it is clearly indicated that plotters threaten party unity today, the editorial says there are only a handful of "hidden antiparty, antisocialist counterrevolutionaries" within the party. All party members, "particularly the party's high-ranking cadres," are instructed to "be frank and forthright politically." In order to improve the work style of the party as well as party spirit, party members are encouraged to state their "political views openly" and to express agreement or opposition "on every important political issue, adhering to what is right and correcting what is wrong."

The necessity for party committees to exercise unified leadership "over all kinds of work" including "industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, the army and the government" is given specific stress. Members of party committees "at all levels" must work to strengthen their concept of the party "and place themselves within the party committee and not outside it, still less above it." Deeper study of the works of Marx, Lenin and Mao is prescribed for all party members to help them distinguish between the "Marxist line and the opportunist line."

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"SWINDLERS" ARE ATTACKED FOR ERRORS IN AGRICULTURAL LINE

Peking propagandists are clearly making a major effort to smear the targets of the current purge with the same accusations brought earlier against Liu Shao-chi. The incessant coupling of Liu with current "political swindlers" seems to answer the same purpose as the portrayal of Liu, early in the cultural revolution, as "China's Khrushchev." The latest items in this campaign charge the "political swindlers" with having undermined Mao's agricultural policies by fomenting deviations on both the left and the right; the charges now dredged up differ little from those earlier aimed at Liu alone.

An article in RED FLAG No. 12, broadcast by Radio Peking on 27 November, is aimed primarily at the leftist errors of the swindlers. It indicates that they first tried to undermine the commune system in the late 50's by immediately putting the communes under state control and by ignoring the need to retain private plots during the current stage of socialist development. The article, by a county first secretary, notes that the masses' enthusiasm had been "dampened" by the leftist policies as well as by the overtly rightist attacks which followed. Moderate current policies outlined by the article clearly show that leaders pushing a leftist line during the cultural revolution have lost out, but it seems unlikely that Lin and the military leaders were actually guilty of this particular deviation; most of the experiments in leftist agricultural policy were dropped after 1967 when the army became dominant.

An article by the writing group of the Anhwei Provincial CCP Committee, broadcast by Peking on 30 November, focuses its attack on agricultural mechanization, with a lengthy theoretical discussion on the need for collectivization to precede mechanization. The article adds little of substance to the voluminous file of charges already aimed at Liu for crimes in this field, but it does state that Liu's errors will still be a threat as long as any vestige of private ownership exists. Without calling for an immediate end to private ownership, the article notes that ideas of the old society still influence not only exploiters, "but also exert an influence in varying degrees on the masses of people." Because of this lingering influence of the old society, it remains possible for agents of the bourgeoisie to sneak into the party "in order to usurp leadership of the party and state."

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PRC - PAKISTAN

PEKING REAFFIRMS MEASURED SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN

In the wake of Pakistan's charge of 22 November that India has launched an "all-out offensive against East Pakistan," Peking has become more vocal in its declarations of support for Pakistan and in its denunciation of Indian "subversive activities and military provocations." However, Peking's stand on the crisis surrounding events in East Pakistan has not shifted substantively from previous Chinese statements of policy--notably Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei's comments on 7 November during Ali Bhutto's visit to the PRC.* In particular, Peking has been careful not to characterize current Indian actions as "foreign aggression," against which the Chinese have pledged support to Pakistan in vague terms. Peking has reiterated its call for "peaceful consultations" to settle the dispute and for "serious consideration" to be given to President Yahya Khan's "reasonable proposal" for a mutual withdrawal and disengagement of armed forces from the border areas.

INDIAN ACTIONS

Reflecting Peking's anxiety over the increased tension in the Indian subcontinent, Chou En-lai, at a meeting with the Pakistani ambassador on the 24th at which he received a letter from Yahya Khan, "expressed concern over the military provocations carried out by India along the East Pakistan border in the past few days." From that date Peking has given limited coverage to press reports--principally Pakistani--detailing alleged Indian military activities against Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. Since 20 August Chinese media had discontinued publicizing Pakistani charges of Indian military activities. An NCNA dispatch on the 24th and Peking radio broadcasts in Bengali on the 25th cited Associated Press of Pakistan reports of the 22d that "India, without a formal declaration of war, launched an all-out offensive against East Pakistan" and that Yahya Khan had declared a state of emergency throughout Pakistan. On the 28th an NCNA report focused on Indian press articles and Western press agency dispatches citing Indian admissions that Indian forces had been given the "authority to invade East Pakistan by crossing over the border under the pretext of 'self-defense.'"

* Peking's carefully measured treatment of Bhutto's 5-8 November "friendly visit" is discussed in the TRENDS of 10 November, pages 28-31.

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A wide-ranging NCNA article on the 29th charged that in the past week the Indian Government, "supported and encouraged by social imperialism, has been carrying out repeated subversive activities and military provocations against East Pakistan," sending large numbers of armed forces across the border and occupying Pakistani territory. Quoting Pakistani news sources for detailed reports of Indian military activities in East Pakistan, NCNA noted that the Indian troops were using many Soviet-made weapons and charged that the USSR "was speeding up its supply of large amounts of arms and military material for the Indian Government." Accusing the Soviets of exerting diplomatic pressure on Pakistan, the report recalled Podgornyy's 3 April letter to Yahya Khan and noted a more recent letter "generally on the same line as the previous one." NCNA also took note of a number of recent PRAVDA articles which, "turning white into black, blamed Pakistan for creating tension in the Hindustan subcontinent and tried to intimidate Pakistan into accepting a 'political solution' beneficial to India."

CHINESE SUPPORT

Though Chou on the 24th was quoted only as having expressed concern at Indian "military provocations," Peking's support for Pakistan was reaffirmed by Li Shui-ching, Minister of the First Ministry of Machine Building and head of a PRC delegation attending two ceremonies in Pakistan in connection with PRC-aided projects, and by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien at a reception given by the Albanian ambassador on the 29th. At a banquet in Islamabad on the 24th, Li Shiu-ching assured his hosts that "should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle to defend their state sovereignty and national independence." This commitment is identical to that pledged by Chi Peng-fei on 7 November at a Peking banquet for the visiting Pakistani delegation headed by Ali Bhutto. On 25 November, following a similar pledge, Li Shiu-ching added vaguely that "we are firmly convinced that a just cause is bound to be victorious and that the friendship between the peoples of China and Pakistan will be consolidated and developed continuously."

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Pledging Chinese support for Pakistan "in their just struggle against foreign aggression and in defense of their state sovereignty and national independence," Li Hsien-nien on the 29th declared that the tension on the subcontinent had been "aggravated" by the "subversive activities and military provocations" of the Indian Government, "supported and encouraged by social imperialism." Expressing the PRC's "great concern" and pressing for "peaceful consultations" by "the two parties concerned," Li Hsien-nien urged that "serious consideration" be given to Yahya Khan's mutual withdrawal proposal.

Though Chinese comment specifically devoted to the Indian-Pakistani dispute has remained silent about the Soviet-Indian treaty, this subject was broached for the first time in Chinese media in the text of Chiao Kuan-hua's address to the UN General Assembly on 26 November rebutting a Soviet attack on Peking's disarmament policy. Released by NCNA on the 27th, Chiao's speech included an attack on the Soviet Union for having concluded what "in essence" is "a treaty of military alliance" with "a neighbor of China." Chiao charged that with "the encouragement and support of this treaty" the unnamed neighbor "launched bare-faced armed aggression against Pakistan, another neighbor of China, thus aggravating tension in Asia." Apart from this speech, Peking has not drawn implications for Asian security generally in discussing the Indian-Pakistani crisis.

Peking has also been careful--in view of the Chinese commitment to "support" Pakistan in the event of "foreign aggression" against that country--to avoid using that term in its own name when describing current Indian actions. Apart from Chiao's reference to "armed aggression," the Chinese have instead referred to "subversive activities and military provocations."

REFUGEE PROBLEM Peking has used the United Nations as a forum for airing its views on another issue--the East Pakistan refugee problem--that it had avoided in commenting on the Indian-Pakistani conflict. While Peking has shied away from dealing with the events in East Pakistan prompting the crisis, it set forth its stand "on the so-called 'question of refugees from East Pakistan'" in a statement on 19 November by one of its delegates addressing the UNGA Third Committee. The only previous reference in PRC media to the refugee issue was contained in a 26 June NCNA dispatch quoting a Pakistani spokesman as saying that India was "trying to prevent the displaced people from returning to their homes in East Pakistan."

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The speech by the Chinese delegate at the United Nations, transmitted by NCNA, contended that the refugee problem arose "due to a certain country's intervention in Pakistan's internal affairs." The delegate, Fu Hao, declared that "the country concerned" has repeatedly rejected all of Pakistan's proposals "to relax the tension on the subcontinent and settle the question of refugees." Fu Hao compared these "tactics of interference in the internal affairs of other countries" with those of "a certain neighboring country" which "plotted a rebellion in the Tibetan region of our country and carried out subversive activities." Stressing that the refugee problem is purely an internal matter and that the first step to its solution is cessation of "the interference in Pakistan's internal affairs," Fu distinguished the refugee problem from "disputes between states." The latter, he explained "should be settled through consultation between the countries concerned."

* The Chinese delegates' consistent failure to refer to India by name--in contrast to direct attacks on the Soviet Union and the United States--suggests an effort by Peking to softpedal its censure of another member of "the third world." In his maiden speech to the UNGA, Chiao Kuan-hua had declared that the PRC was a member of the third world and had voiced Peking's line of opposition by small and medium countries against the two super-powers.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW PICTURES ISRAEL AS INCREASINGLY MILITARISTIC

As the UNGA debate on the Middle East approaches, Moscow propaganda--including signed articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA--builds up a picture of an increasingly militant Israel creating an atmosphere reminiscent of that prior to the June 1967 war and again threatening the Arabs. Orekhov in PRAVDA on the 28th, for example, accused Abba Eban of declaring in the Knesset that Israel is ready to renew war, and Shimon Peres of "threatening Egypt that after the new war it 'would have to hold talks not about the frontiers existing before the 1967 six-day war but about the frontiers which will arise as a result of the conflict in 1971 or 1972.'"

At the same time, Moscow dismisses Israeli "inventions" about "alleged belligerency among the Arabs," charging that Israeli propaganda falsifies the statements of Egyptian leaders and "screams about Cairo's inflexible position." Propagandists continue to portray Egypt as seeking a political settlement and planning to present "substantial constructive proposals" in the UNGA discussion, and they characterize the Arab countries as "maintaining self-control and keeping cool." The United States is routinely described as not only failing to try to restrain the Israeli leaders, but encouraging Tel Aviv's "extremist demands."

As evidence of the "militarist campaign" conducted by Israel and its U.S. supporters, commentators point to Tel Aviv's demands for further Phantom deliveries, Senate approval of half a billion dollars to finance "new offensive weapons deliveries" to Israel, press reports of U.S. "intention" to supply Israel with surface-to-surface Lance missiles, reports of a "secret Pentagon-Israeli agreement" on assistance in production of military equipment in Israel, and the announcement of Golda Meir's forthcoming talks in Washington. A domestic service broadcast on the 26th briefly noted that UN cease-fire observers reported an overflight of Egyptian positions on the canal by two Israeli military aircraft--date unspecified--and that Egyptian anti-aircraft batteries were forced to open fire. TRUD correspondent Repin, according to TASS on the 26th, acknowledged that the Arab countries, taking into consideration the "military psychosis being whipped up" in Israel, are taking steps to increase combat preparedness "of their troops and rear" to frustrate Israeli designs.

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FORMER MIDEAST COMMENTATOR MAKSIMOV AUTHORS SERIES IN ARABIC

A series of talks broadcast in Moscow's Arabic-language service 22-25 November marks the reappearance of Yevgeniy Maksimov as a radio commentator on Middle East affairs. His commentaries had from time to time been featured on Arabic-language broadcasts from 1955 through 1959. His only known--and noteworthy--comment on the area since then was his discussion, in the 27 January 1970 PRAVDA, of the Soviet proposals for a Middle East settlement. This major article marked the first time in Soviet mass propaganda that elements of the proposals had been specifically identified as those advanced by the USSR.* A PRAVDA article by Vasiliyev in January 1969 had first outlined the December 1968 Soviet proposals but without identifying them as such.

The current Maksimov series has dealt with Moscow's understanding of a political settlement; a shift in international public opinion since 1967 more sympathetic to the Arabs; Soviet military assistance to the Arabs while supporting a political settlement; and Moscow's position vis-a-vis the Palestinian question.**

In the talk on the 24th, Maksimov argued that there is no inconsistency in the Soviet position of supporting a political settlement while enhancing the combat capability of the Arab armies. The USSR believes, according to Maksimov, that as long as the "consequences of Israeli aggression" have not been eliminated, "the Arab countries could struggle with greater success for a political settlement when they are strong and capable of curbing Israeli aggression." Maksimov recalled that during President as-Sadat's October visit to Moscow, agreement was reached "by which the Soviet Union would make a new contribution toward strengthening Egypt's military power." But he went on to stress that this "has been and is still being done" by the USSR "while insisting on a Middle East political settlement."

In the last broadcast, Maksimov rejected two "erroneous, harmful, and extremely dangerous" views: any attempt to reach a political settlement which disregards the Palestinian question,

* See the 28 January 1970 TRENDS, pages 16-19.

** The first two commentaries are discussed in the 24 November 1971 TRENDS, pages 20-21.

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and any attempt to make the Palestinian question preeminent over all other issues of a political settlement. Maksimov advocated a middle ground. The Palestinians' struggle for their "national rights" could only succeed, he said, if they are a part of the joint front struggling for "liquidation of the consequences of the Israeli aggression." Noting that the Palestinians "practice the right to carry out both armed acts and political activity," he in effect advised them to use "all forms of struggle and not just one form to the exclusion of all others."

MOSCOW NOTES JORDANIAN PREMIER "KILLED" IN CAIRO

The 28 November assassination of Jordanian Premier and Defense Minister Wasfi at-Tall in Cairo is acknowledged by Moscow in a one-sentence TASS report that day datelined Cairo. Citing the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, TASS says only that at-Tall, who was in Cairo for a session of the Arab Joint Defense Council, "was killed today" at the entrance to the Sheraton Hotel. In keeping with past Soviet disapproval of Palestinian extremist actions, such as aircraft hijackings, TASS fails to explain how he was killed and makes no mention of the assailants, members of an organization called Black September.

Promptly reporting the formation of the new Jordanian cabinet, TASS reports from Amman on the 29th that it is headed by Ahmad al-Lawzi, who also holds the defense ministry post, and that the transport minister has also been given the finance portfolio (formerly al-Lawzi's). TASS adds that there are no other changes "as compared to the cabinet headed by the last prime minister, Wasfi at-Tall." The item concludes by noting, without comment, that a government declaration broadcast by Radio Amman stresses that the new cabinet will continue the former political course.

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ROMANIA - YUGOSLAVIA

TITO-CEAUSESCU COMMUNIQUE STRESSES INDEPENDENCE, AFFINITY

Yugoslav and Romanian media played up the Tito-Ceausescu meeting in Timisoara on 23-24 November as confirmation of the excellent state of relations and solidarity between the two countries and parties. The Romanians in particular gave the meeting extensive coverage, with an article in the party organ SCINTEIA on the 27th hailing it as "a brilliant expression of Romanian-Yugoslav friendship and a remarkable contribution to the general cause of peace and socialism." The lengthy joint communique issued on the 25th says the talks took place in an atmosphere of "friendship, cordiality, and full mutual esteem and understanding," adding that the two sides reached "an identity or great closeness of views" on the questions discussed.

The emphasis on close Romanian-Yugoslav collaboration and general identity of views was apparently designed for domestic as well as international consumption, to offset any notion that Ceausescu's independent policies have resulted in Romania's isolation or that Brezhnev's 22-26 September visit to Belgrade has in any way adversely affected Belgrade's special relationship with Bucharest.* In an apparent gesture of reassurance to Ceausescu on this score, Tito used the occasion of a toast on the 24th to suggest that the two leaders "could meet not only once but even twice" a year or "at any time there is an opportunity for it." The strong emphasis on bilateral ties is underlined in a section of the communique dealing with economic cooperation between the two countries. Noting that "untapped possibilities" still exist for further cooperation, the document calls for broadening economic, scientific,

* Although the Romanians predictably welcomed the Brezhnev-Tito talks, Bucharest's highly selective coverage of Brezhnev's Yugoslav visit and its pointed failure to report the Soviet leader's subsequent visits to Budapest and Sofia seemed suggestive of disquiet over Soviet motives. Reflecting apparent concern to avoid portraying a Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement for Romanian domestic consumption, the AGERPRES account of the 25 September Soviet-Yugoslav joint statement, carried in the Bucharest press, omitted passages referring to the existence of a good basis for further development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, the planned increase in interparty contacts and state-level consultations, and the agreement on mass media exchanges. The AGERPRES account also left out a concluding passage dealing with mutual friendship.

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and technical cooperation, as well as for broadened contacts and cooperation between scientific and cultural institutions and between press organs and other media.

In the wake of Brezhnev's public reaffirmation of the principles of the 1955 Belgrade statement and the 1956 Moscow declaration, the communique reasserts both sides' resolve to promote relations with "all" communist parties on the basis of "equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in internal affairs" and upholds the right of every party to build its internal and foreign policy platforms "in line with conditions in its country."

Capping talks which presumably encompassed the Yugoslav leader's discussions with President Nixon in Washington in late October as well as his earlier talks with Brezhnev, the communique reiterates the two sides' shared policy of developing relations of friendship and cooperation with all countries, regardless of social systems, on the basis of principles of independence, sovereignty, equality, mutual benefit, and noninterference, in the interests of international detente. There is no specific mention of the Soviet Union anywhere in the document, or of China except in an approving reference to Peking's entry into the United Nations. But Belgrade's and Bucharest's already manifest approval for the Chinese and Soviet invitations to President Nixon is reflected in a passage welcoming the "intensified direct contacts and exchanges of views between heads of state and governments of different countries," accompanied by a replay of the theme that the solving of world problems requires the participation of all countries--"big, medium, and small."

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT Both sides reaffirm their support for a European security conference without preconditions and with U.S. and Canadian participation. Underscoring what Belgrade and Bucharest evidently both hope to gain from such a conclave, the document expresses hope that it "will contribute to the building of a system of European security that would effectively guarantee peace, independence, and sovereignty for all European states as well as cooperation based on equality"--a formulation that in effect defines an antidote to the Brezhnev doctrine.

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With much the same thrust, the communique follows up a plea for general and complete disarmament* with a call for partial measures including the renunciation of military maneuvers on foreign territories and the banning of new military bases or emplacement of nuclear weapons on other countries' territories. It also calls for liquidating foreign military bases, withdrawal of troops to within national boundaries, and the elimination of military blocs.

In the European context, and with the Macedonian question possibly in mind, the communique makes a noteworthy call for the "inviolability" of borders and declares that "respect for the territorial integrity of all European countries represents an essential prerequisite" for relaxing European tensions and promoting cooperation.

THE BALKANS The only direct reference to the Balkans in the communique is a brief call for multilateral and bilateral cooperation and for turning the Balkans into a zone of peace without nuclear weapons--an objective long pressed by Romania. An indication that the two sides may differ in their approaches to Balkan security was reflected in the toasts exchanged between the two leaders on the 23d. Where Ceausescu made a pitch for the Romanian proposal to convert the Balkans into a zone of peace and multilateral cooperation, Tito in reply stressed the need for readiness to defend independence and sovereignty and commented vaguely that "our two countries will contribute to a broader and faster stabilization of the situation in the Balkans, contributing in this way to world peace."

Reflecting Belgrade's general preference for bilateral over multilateral cooperation and its aversion to blocs, Tito's apparent lack of enthusiasm for multilateral Balkan cooperation may also mirror a Yugoslav belief that chances of cooperation with Sofia are negligible because of the perennial Macedonian question. As if to offset any impression of negativism on Belgrade's part, however, Tito remarked defensively in a final toast on the 24th that Yugoslavia was willing to work toward solving "dissonant" problems in the Balkans.

* Against the background of the acrimonious Sino-Soviet exchange in the United Nations over the rival Soviet and PRC proposals for a world disarmament conference, the communique calls in a one-sentence paragraph for "the convening of a general disarmament conference with the participation of all states."

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INTERNAL AFFAIRS The two leaders acquainted each other with "the achievements, success, and further development of the two countries," according to the communique, and "exchanged views on experiences gained" in socialist building. The document is predictably devoid of any hint at internal problems facing either country, but Tito remarked in his toast on the 24th that "we have to focus our attention first of all on solving our domestic problems, as we still have much to do so as to meet the requirements of our socialist society."

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GERMAN CP

ILLEGAL KPD TREATED AS STILL EXTANT, THOUGH INOPERATIVE

The second congress of the legal German Communist Party (DKP), held in Duesseldorf 25-28 November, repeated the long-standing demand that the FRG government annul the 1956 Federal Constitutional Court decision declaring the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) illegal, despite indications in the media that the KPD exists in name only if at all and that its legality has become an academic question. The KPD has been without a titular head since late September, when its leader, Max Reimann, publicly announced his decision to join the DKP and stated that he now belonged to that party alone. Within days of Reimann's announcement, the KPD's clandestine radio went off the air after broadcasting for 15 years from East Germany. And there has been no mention since, from Moscow or East Berlin, of KPD statements or activities.

BACKGROUND ON THE DKP The DKP was founded on 25 September 1968 in Frankfurt. The statement announcing its formation declared the new party's respect for the West German constitution and resolve to defend "the basic democratic rights and principles" set forth in that document. While the formation of the new party seemed clearly designed to circumvent the West German ban on the KPD, the announcement sought to get across the idea that the new party was not to displace the KPD, reiterating the demand that the ban on the illegal party be lifted.

The DKP held its first congress in Essen in April 1969. Its draft theses for the recent second congress, published in the DKP organ UNSERE ZEIT on 7 August of this year, was at pains to conform to the pledge of allegiance to the FRG constitution by avoiding the Marxist-Leninist positions espoused by the KPD; rather than calling for a "dictatorship of the proletariat," for example, it appealed to West German "anti-monopolist forces" to gain "a decisive influence on the government and society" and called for development of a socialist society in West Germany "on the basis of the democratic principles and rights proclaimed in the constitution."

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A recent article in the Zagreb daily VJESNIK by the paper's Rome correspondent, published in installments on 4 and 6 October, discussed the efforts to legalize the German communist party in the context of a review of Italian Communist Party (PCI) efforts as a go-between to help improve East European communist countries' relations with the FRG. The paper mentioned a meeting between PCI Secretary General Luigi Longo and the then Chancellor Kiesinger when the latter, along with the then Foreign Minister Brandt, was in Rome on an official visit in February 1968. Kiesinger and Longo, the paper said, discussed the question of legalizing the KPD. VJESNIK noted that shortly thereafter the legal DKP came into existence, "having accepted Kiesinger's suggestion" that the KDP's party statutes "be harmonized with the West German constitution."*

The Yugoslav paper's portrayal of the DKP as designed from the outset to supplant the KPD squares with evidence in the propaganda of a well-orchestrated scenario--with the CPSU a key participant--to ease the KPD out of the picture and bring a respectable party to the forefront. The termination of the virulently anti-FRG broadcasts of the KPD's clandestine radio in particular serves as a tangible response to Brandt's Ostpolitik. In the year since the signing of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn, Brandt has been quoted repeatedly in the Western press as stating that one of the gains for West Germany accruing from his Ostpolitik has been the reduction of anti-FRG invective issuing from the media of Moscow and its bloc allies. But the full scenario has yet to be played out, with the KPD, apparently in limbo, still treated as an entity seeking legal recognition.

**REIMANN'S SWITCH &
FADEOUT OF THE KPD**

The 72-year-old KPD Central Committee First Secretary Max Reimann, who has campaigned for years to get the ban on the KPD annulled, was formally elected to DKP membership on 27 September 1971 by the local party organization in Rheinhausen, in the Ruhr-Westphalia area of West Germany, according to a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND report two days later. On 25 September NEUES DEUTSCHLAND had published an ADN account of an interview

* In October 1968, shortly after the announcement of the new party's formation, the Federal Government withdrew the standing 1954 arrest warrant for Reimann, who arrived back in West Germany on 14 November 1968.

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granted by Reimann to the DKP press service on the 23d, with a prefatory comment noting that "Reimann had expressed the desire to join the DKP" and that the local DKP leadership was recommending that he be elected "honorary chairman" of the DKP. He was duly elected to the honorary post at the DKP congress on 26 November, according to ADN and PRAVDA.

Reimann explained in the interview that his motives for joining the DKP, whose establishment he had "welcomed from the very beginning," were "simple" in that the DKP, as the legal Marxist-Leninist party of the West German workers class, strives for all the proper goals of "freedom, democracy, and socialism" in the FRG. Pointing out that he had devoted all his strength in recent years to the struggle for lifting the ban on the KPD, Reimann asserted that this struggle "is and remains an urgent political necessity." But he added that it was only natural that he should join the DKP. As if to forestall any idea that this decision was not entirely his own, Reimann said that he had publicly declared many times his intention to "set the date" for his entry into the DKP and that "now is the time." He stated that he now belonged to "one party, the DPK; thus I am exercising no party functions outside the DKP." But he hastened to add that his DPK membership had "nothing to do with a 'merger' of the DKP and the KPD"; he was merely exercising the constitutional right of every West German citizen to join a legal political party.

Reimann's purportedly spontaneous decision to join the DKP was made known a month after he visited the USSR: On 27 August, TASS reported that "KPD Central Committee First Secretary Reimann" was "on rest" there "at the invitation" of the CPSU Central Committee and was received by Politburo member Kirilenko and Central Committee Secretary Ponomarev, head of the international section. A formal statement had been issued in the name of the KPD as recently as 12 August--a central committee statement marking the 15th anniversary of the West German ban on the party. The KPD had been issuing its customary pronouncements and Reimann had been performing his customary functions through the spring and early summer, attending and addressing the CPSU congress in March and the SED congress in June in his capacity as head of the KPD; the party had sent a greetings message to the CPSU congress.

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No KPD message was publicized in early November during the observance of the October Revolution anniversary. Noting Reimann's unanimous election by the DKP congress as honorary chairman of the legal party, PRAVDA on 26 November simply identified him as "minent figure of the German workers movement." Addressing the congress on the 25th Reimann perfunctorily repeated the demand that the ban on the KPD be lifted; ADN reported Reimann's speech, but the CPSU and SED delegates at the congress, politburo members Pelshe and Norden, respectively, did not mention the KPD.

The KPD's clandestine radio, "German Freedom Station 904," which purported to broadcast clandestinely from within the FRG but in fact used a transmitter at Magdeburg, East Germany, has not been heard since 1 October--four days after Reimann was admitted into the DPK. It had been on the air since 20 August 1956, three days after the KPD was declared illegal.

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FRG - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

PRAGUE COMMENT DURING BILATERAL TALKS ANTICIPATES PROGRESS

Czechoslovak media have yet to comment on the outcome of the most recent round of FRG-Czechoslovak "exploratory talks," held in the Bavarian town of Rothenburg ob der Tauber on 18 and 19 November, but two Czechoslovak press commentaries appearing while the talks were in session seemed to buttress prior propaganda indications of expected progress. Western press reports say the talks were viewed in Prague government circles with satisfaction, and West German sources have noted that FRG representative State Secretary Frank presented to his counterpart, Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Gotz, a "draft formulation" which went to the "utmost limit" that Bonn can "justify" on the pivotal issue of the Czechoslovak demand that West Germany declare the Munich agreement invalid ab initio; Gotz in turn reportedly made a counteroffer in the form of a "suggestion."

Against the background of publicly acknowledged progress toward a solution in the inner-German phase of the Berlin negotiations and of the developing momentum for convening of a conference on European security and cooperation, the Slovak youth paper SMENA on the 18th, the first day of the recent two-day round of talks, offered what seems the most optimistic public assessment in Czechoslovak media to date on the prospects for the bilateral talks since they started in March 1971. Citing "West German information," SMENA said the fourth round of the talks "should take place in a more favorable spirit," since at the third round in Prague in September "both sides agreed on the procedure which should be followed." After routinely taking the Brandt government to task for not adopting a "realistic and constructive attitude" on the Munich agreement similar to that shown in concluding the Moscow and Warsaw treaties and in cooperating to solve the "West Berlin question," SMENA made a notable effort--for the first time in Czechoslovak media--to dispel West German concern that if the Munich agreement is declared invalid ab initio, as Prague insists, former Sudeten Germans could be affected by Czechoslovak laws regarding such crimes as high treason in 1938 and by other legal issues.

Arguing along lines first broached in a Moscow radio talk by "historian" Aleksandr Galkin in September, SMENA also discounted

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West German apprehensions over the consequences of meeting Prague's demand on the Munich agreement: "It is surely obvious that the CSSR did not implement such an attitude toward the Germans who had remained in our country after the war, and it does not do so toward the Sudeten Germans who are now FRG citizens and who have come to our country as tourists."

Possibly anticipating the Bonn "draft" and Prague "suggestion" which FRG sources say were advanced in the bilateral talks, SMENA said questions concerning state citizenship "should, in fact, be codified by the agreement on the normalization of relations." It added that "no specific work" on this has been started "as yet."

Another Czechoslovak commentary, in the Prague daily SVOBODNE SLOVO on the 19th, argued that the Prague position on the Munich agreement is based on the "legal continuity" of the Czechoslovak state as extant prior to September 1938--a view which, the article noted, has been adopted subsequent to the Munich agreement by the United Kingdom, France, and Italy as signatory powers, leaving only the FRG as one of the German successor states to repudiate the agreement. But the paper went on, in an abrupt change of tone, to declare that "partial problems still exist today which must be solved and which concern that entire [World War II] period," and "certainly it is possible to arrive at a solution."

Neither the authoritative party daily RUDE PRAVO nor CTK has commented on the fourth round of the talks, and the talks have been unmentioned by Czechoslovak leaders in their many speeches in the past two weeks connected with the local and national elections. Only Pavel Auersperg, Central Committee member in charge of the party's international affairs department, in a speech at the German Communist Party (DKP) congress in Duesseldorf on 25 November, ..as discussed Prague-Bonn relations since the fourth round. Repeating the standard Czechoslovak demand for recognition of the nonvalidity of the Munich agreement ab initio, Auersperg used language almost identical to that of CPCZ Presidium member Bilak on 11 November in stating that "no Czechoslovak government" can ever recognize the temporary validity of the Munich accord.*

* See the TRENDS of 17 November 1971, pages 34-36, for a discussion of this new twist introduced by Bilak.

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CZECHOSLOVAK ELECTIONS

PRAGUE, MOSCOW DEFENSIVE ON MANDATE OF LONG-DELAYED VOTE

Czechoslovak media, seconded by Moscow, insist that the outcome of the 26-27 November elections to the country's local and national governing bodies amounts to a massive defeat for the "rightists" and proof that the post-1968 "consolidation" has been successfully completed. The vote was the first nationwide election held in the CSSR since 1964; scheduled for 1968, it was postponed, as the conservatives desired, until after the consolidation process permitted a controlled 14th CPCZ Congress--finally convened last May after a five-year interval. CTK on 28 November publicized a figure of 99.45-percent participation in the election by eligible voters, compared with publicized totals of 98-plus percent in similar elections held in the GDR on 14 November and in Hungary on 25 April. Prague's announced results dispensed with the usual formality--observed in the GDR and Hungary--of a small total of "invalid" ballots. There was no publicity for any contests in the CSSR elections, as had been the case in the Hungarian vote.

TASS on the 28th, reporting the results of the election, carried a commentary by PRAVDA's Prague correspondent Grinyuk proclaiming the outcome proof that "the hopes of the enemies of Czechoslovakia that the party of Czechoslovak communists will fail in regaining the people's trust, in overcoming the difficulties and in directing the republic along the road of further socialist development, have dismally collapsed." The voters, Grinyuk said, "voted 'yes' for the socialist system, for the policy of their communist party, for friendship with the peoples of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."

DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES Prague media acknowledged the existence, if not the scope, of disruptive activities during the balloting despite the carefully prepared scenario. Thus the Prague domestic service on the 27th, ambiguously noting that the elections "were largely carried out in a spirited fashion," added that "isolated negative phenomena during the first day of the elections did not influence the voters and were condemned by the people themselves." The party organ RUDE PRAVO on the same day, hailing in advance the defeat of the "right-wing," declared that "the enemies of our socialist set-up have failed to disturb the dignified course of the elections, to trouble the peaceful, optimistic atmosphere" and that "they have not managed to launch any organized campaign, and all isolated attempts to do so had no response."

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After the results were in, RUDE PRAVO on the 29th, in a commentary entitled "Maturity," included low-keyed observations to the effect that the election results were "more positive than many expected" and demonstrated a "further switch of public opinion." The commentary cited "the fiasco of the policy of boycotting the elections which foreign reaction sought to propagate hand-in-hand with the orphan renegades in the country, opportunists and revisionists, who were anxious to undermine confidence in the CPCZ." The paper's main target was clearly the arch-liberal Josef Smrkovsky, who had publicly deprecated the 14th CPCZ Congress and, indirectly, the impending November national elections in an interview published in the Milan weekly GIORNI-VIE NUOVE in mid-September. RUDE PRAVO's 29 November commentary was notably candid in describing the pre-election period as one of "struggle" and of resolute efforts for "the liquidation of disruption" and for "a sincere relationship with the USSR." It claimed that the populace "gradually" came around to the side of "truth."

The prominent role played by the unpopular leading party conservatives in the conduct of the elections was recognized, approvingly, in a Grinyuk dispatch on the election preparations published in PRAVDA on 24 November. Grinyuk reported "big public meetings" at which "the country's prominent party and state figures V. Bilak, K. Hoffman, A. Indra, J. Lenart, L. Strougal, and others" spoke. The dispatch reported Gustav Husak as pledging, in a pre-election meeting, "consistent adherence" to the May 1970 Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship treaty--"the treaty which we rightly consider the guarantee of the free life of our people and a pledge of the independence of our state"

In a major speech in Prague on the 24th, Husak declared: "We are able to say today that Czechoslovakia is an economically and politically consolidated state." The main preoccupation of the speech, however, was a defensive depreciation of enemies of Husak's regime at home and abroad. The Czechoslovak leader assailed economic reformist Ota Sik, now teaching at the University of Basel, and took a further swipe at Smrkovsky: "A man who has in recent years had a certain important position in politics made himself heard by way of bourgeois channels, alleging that only about 10 percent of the people are behind this communist regime."

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The regime's sensitivity to such statements was exemplified further in a harsh commentary by Rohacek in the Prague domestic service on the 29th which leveled new direct attacks on Smrkovsky, who "dared to assert" that only 10 percent of the populace backed the leadership, as well as on Dubcek and Frantisek Kriegel. The commentary scored alleged Western news reports that Smrkovsky "abstained" from the elections and alleged Western efforts to exploit the recent birthday of "a man who is hardly remembered by anyone in this country today, the bankrupt politician Alexander Dubcek." It appeared to revive the spectre of prosecution of Dubcek in adding that "a wavering opportunist has become a patron of the counter-revolution." The talk concluded that "the mandate" of both parts of the CSSR "is firmly in the hands of our leadership, and it will never be otherwise."

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

CENTRAL COMMITTEE, SOVIET MEETINGS APPROVE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Final formal ratification of the USSR's ninth five-year plan occurred at the Central Committee plenum on 22-23 November and the Supreme Soviet session on 24-26 November. At the plenum, Baybakov delivered the main address on the five-year plan and the 1972 plan, while Garbuzov reported on the budget. Brezhnev delivered a major address on the party's conduct of foreign policy since the 24th Party Congress as well as a summing-up speech on the economic issues. These speeches have not been released, but a plenum resolution routinely approving the Politburo's handling of foreign policy is given wide publicity.

At the Supreme Soviet session, Kosygin delivered the report on the five-year plan as well as a further closing statement following the debate, while Garbuzov again reported on the budget. Excerpts of Kosygin's speeches have been very widely publicized, and text of his and Garbuzov's speeches are carried in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA. Most of the summaries of Kosygin's report, as well as editorials in IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA on 27-28 November, reiterate the relatively restrained prediction of the plan documents that total Soviet industrial and agricultural output in 1975 will exceed the current U.S. level of output.

The most dramatic development of the meetings was a negative one--Voronov was not removed from the Politburo. Last July, almost certainly at Brezhnev's instigation, Voronov had been demoted from RSFSR Premier to the relatively insignificant post of chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee. It was widely thought that he would soon be removed from the Politburo--in what would have been the first such ouster since late 1964 apart from the retirement of overage members Mikoyan and Shvernik in 1966. But the plenum did no more than elevate Mikhail Solomentsev, Voronov's successor as RSFSR Premier, from the secretariat to candidate membership of the Politburo.

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CONSUMER GOODS Kosygin's report displays continued high-level sensitivity over the changed relationship between the two sectors of industry--producer goods (Group A) and consumer goods (Group B)--in the new five-year plan. Unlike Brezhnev, who had candidly discussed the relationship between the two branches of industry in his report to the 24th CPSU Congress last March and had justified "a certain preferential growth rate for Group B," Kosygin skirted the subject entirely. Instead of disclosing the planned growth rates for the two sectors of industry, as he had at the congress, Kosygin merely reported the planned growth rate for industry as a whole (47 percent) without any breakdown by sectors. In the body of his report, however, he gave a rounded-off growth rate for consumer goods production in the new plan (49 percent).

Kosygin's omission was corrected in the official version of the five-year plan published on 27 November, which reported the growth rates for Groups A and B at 46.3 percent and 48.6 percent, respectively. Commenting on these rates, a 1 December PRAVDA editorial reassures its readers that the higher growth rate for consumer goods production "does not mean, of course, any lessening of attention given to heavy industry, which is the foundation of the country's economic and defensive strength." Although Kosygin gave similar reassurances, his deliberately vague treatment of the problem highlights its sensitivity both as a political issue and, more recently, a public relations problem.

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